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ABSTRACT
We propose and evaluate TwoKind Authentication, a sim-
ple and effective technique that allows users to limit access
to their private information in untrustworthy environments.
Users often log in to Internet sites from insecure comput-
ers, and more recently have started divulging their email
passwords to social-networking sites, thereby putting their
private communications at risk. To mitigate this problem,
we explore the use of multiple authenticators for the same
account that are associated with specific sets of privileges.
In its simplest form, TwoKind features two modes of au-
thentication, a low and a high authenticator. By using a
low authenticator, users can signal to the server they are
in an untrusted environment, following which the server re-
stricts the user’s actions, including access to private data.
In this paper, we seek to evaluate the effectiveness of mul-
tiple authenticators in promoting safer behavior in users.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach through
a user experiment — we find that users make a distinc-
tion between the two authenticators and generally behave
in a security-conscientious way, protecting their high au-
thenticator a majority of the time. Our study suggests that
TwoKind will be beneficial to several Internet applications,
particularly if the privileges can be customized to a user’s
security preferences.
.
1. INTRODUCTION
Users of online applications today are increasingly placing
their private information at risk—a large number of users
routinely access Internet sites from untrustworthy comput-
ers such as email kiosks and Internet cafes. For example,
“Blitz Terminals” (email kiosks) are an integral part of the
Dartmouth undergraduate culture even though nearly all
students own laptops. Malicious administrators of such com-
puters, and even users who are able to install rogue applica-
tions, can easily compromise a user’s session and gain unau-
thorized access to private data. The user’s session can be
hijacked, or even kept alive by spoofing the logout screen,
following which the attacker has unfettered access to all the
user’s private emails, personal profile information, and so
on. In cases where passwords are used as authenticators,
the potential damage is even worse because the user’s au-
thenticator can be compromised and saved for later use. The
risk of session or authenticator compromise is not limited to
the use of untrustworthy computers. Social-networking ser-
vices such as Facebook1 and LinkedIn2 ask for users’ login
information for external email services such as AOL3 and
Google Mail.4 These social-networking services proceed to
download the user’s address book and use it to find the user’s
existing contacts in the social network. In these situations,
users provide an online application with unnecessarily, un-
restricted access to all of the user’s private data on another
application. Ideally, the user would authorize the service to
download only the user’s address book, and disallow access
to email. To address these issues, we propose TwoKind Au-
thentication,5 an authentication technique that allows users
to limit the capabilities of an authenticated session, thereby
limiting the amount of damage that can be caused by session
or authenticator compromise.
Current authentication mechanisms such as one-time
passwords [8] [11] (e.g., RSA SecurID), privileged “trading
passwords” (such as those used by eTrade [4] while placing
trades), or even PKI tokens do not fully solve this problem.
One-time passwords limit the future damage possibly caused
by stolen credentials, but allows full-scale compromise in a
single hijacked session. PKI tokens do not protect against
1http://www.facebook.com
2http:// www.linkedin.com
3http://www.aol.com
4http://mail.google.com
5A brief outline of TwoKind Authentication and our pro-
posed user experiment was presented as a poster at SOUPS
2007 [1].
hijacked sessions either, and can also be susceptible to au-
thenticator hijacking.6 eTrade-style trading passwords are
required by server policy, and users are required to re-enter
a trading password while executing privileged actions such
as trades. Such systems, however, have usability concerns,
since the default mode of access is that of low privilege. Re-
quiring users of an email application to enter a high-privilege
password each time they wanted to access archived email, for
example, would be a nuisance. TwoKind does not prevent
a session from being hijacked; rather, it gives users a con-
venient method to effectively limit the damage caused by
hijacking, and allows more usable access modes from trust-
worthy environments.
In its simplest form, TwoKind features two modes of
authentication—high and low. TwoKind authenticators
could include passwords, PKI-based keys, or hardware to-
kens. To signal untrustworthy environments to the server,
users employ their low authenticator to limit the privileges
of the session. For example, a user’s low authenticator for
an email service may allow access to only the user’s new
messages (and not previously viewed messages, messages in
folders, and so on); the low authenticator for a bank account
may disallow any financial transactions or access to finan-
cial records other than the account balance. In contrast to
eTrade’s trading-password approach, which requires users to
log in with a low-privileged password by default, TwoKind
allows users to log in with full-privileged access under nor-
mal circumstances (assuming that users normally operate
in trustworthy environments, such as on their personal com-
puters), making it less intrusive in general. More generally,
TwoKind allows users to assign specific permissions to their
low authenticator, or use any number of low authenticators
with different, but limited, capabilities.7
We believe that TwoKind authentication will be an at-
tractive solution to people already sensitive to the security
of their account, and studying the effectiveness of TwoKind
in such a population would probably yield obvious and un-
interesting results. Instead, we evaluate its effectiveness in
a general population and seek to determine how often users
will protect their high authenticator in unsafe environments.
We focus on the question of whether users would apply such
a bimodal cost-benefit tradeoff for authenticated sessions,
i.e., “is the TwoKind model easy to understand and apply?”
In our user experiment, we do not investigate the usability
of a particular instantiation of TwoKind . For example, in
a password-based instantiation, users must memorize addi-
tional passwords, and the usability of passwords (in general)
would interfere with our measurements on the usability of
the TwoKind model. In practice, we expect users to pick a
few low passwords to be used across several accounts. It has
already been shown that most users reuse passwords across
various accounts [17]. In PKI-based TwoKind , users must
carry an extra PKI token; not much of a stretch if users can
6Authenticators such as private keys can also be “hi-
jacked” [10], where malicious software is able to instruct the
PKI token to dutifully sign its requests. In the remainder
of the paper we use “authenticator hijacking” to also include
authenticator compromise, as in the case of compromised
passwords.
7We believe, however, that several authenticators with dif-
ferent privileges will lead to confusion, and that TwoKind
authentication—with exactly two levels of privilege—will be
more usable in practice. In this paper, therefore, we evaluate
the effectiveness of TwoKind .
be be convinced to carry a single token.
Our user experiment showed that 70% of subjects under-
stood the motivation behind TwoKind and were able to
apply TwoKind effectively, i.e., they made pragmatic use
of TwoKind based on their assessment of risk. Addition-
ally, 49% of the time, subjects were able to protect their
high passwords in unsafe environments and we therefore
propose TwoKind as a useful authentication method.
1.1 Contributions
We make the following contributions:
1. We propose the use of TwoKind (and its generaliza-
tion), which allows users, or applications on their be-
half, to log in with restricted privileges in untrusted
environments.
2. We perform a controlled user experiment designed to
study the effectiveness of TwoKind if employed by ev-
eryday users.
3. Based on our results, we find that 70% of users can
indeed benefit from the added security provided by
TwoKind .
1.2 Overview
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We
describe TwoKind Authentication in Section 2. Section 3
describes our methodology for evaluating TwoKind Authen-
tication, and in Section 4 we detail the results of our exper-
iment. We present related work in Section 5 and conclude
in Section 7.
2. TWOKIND AUTHENTICATION
We now describe TwoKind more precisely, followed by its
generalization with more than two authenticators.
2.1 Two authenticators for the same account
In TwoKind , users are assigned two authenticators,
high and low, for the same account,8 where the low au-
thenticator is associated with restricted privileges. These
authenticators are used to signal to the server whether the
user is in a safe or unsafe situation, depending on whether
they trust the security of the session. For example, a user
may determine that using an email kiosk is unsafe, or that
giving Facebook his or her Google Mail password is unsafe.
A user may carry two PKI tokens, and use the low token in
unsafe environments, whereas in password-based TwoKind ,
users can use a low password.
More formally, let A be the set of all privileges for user u,
and P (x) be all the privileges associated with the authenti-
cator x. In our model, we assume that the high authenti-
cator is the default authenticator as would be used without
multiple authenticators, and has associated with it all the
privileges P (high) = A. The low authenticator has some
proper subset of these privileges, i.e., P (low) ⊂ A. The
privileges associated with the session are determined by the
low or high authenticator that is used, resulting in privi-
leges P (low) or P (high) respectively. We note that either
the server or the user can define set of privileges P (low)
associated with the low authenticator, although we do not
examine the usability of user-defined privileges in this paper.
8As opposed to being assigned two separate accounts, such
as root and user.
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2.2 Multiple authenticators
Although we focus on and evaluate the simpler concept
of TwoKind Authentication, we expect that some users may
desire the ability to create several authenticators for differ-
ent uses. For example, the user may create an “address-
book password” so that social-networking sites may access
only the user’s address book—nothing else connected with
that email account. The user may create a separate “travel
password” for use in Internet cafes, allowing the sending and
receiving of new mail only (blocking access to folders, and
disallowing any deletions or modifications to the account).
For n-Kind authentication, users possess the following au-
thenticators: low1, low2, . . . , lown−1, high. For each lowi,
we have that P (lowi) ⊂ A, and these sets are not necessar-
ily disjoint (different low passwords may have some privi-
leges in common). Again, either the server or the user could
define these sets of privileges. The server may even allow
a combination of the two (a static set of server-defined per-
missions, with the option of adding and/or removing certain
permissions to the authenticator).
3. USER-EXPERIMENT DESIGN
We designed our user study to determine how users would
employ their TwoKind authenticators when presented with
safe and unsafe environments. Subjects participated in a
game designed to measure their risk-taking habits, given
TwoKind as a means to mitigate the risks.
3.1 Design rationale
The prime concern in creating the study was to avoid co-
ercing the subjects into behaving in a manner that would
yield positive results for the study. To overemphasize nei-
ther task completion nor the security concerns, we designed
the study as a game. The game incentivized subjects to com-
plete tasks in return for points, but disincentivized subjects
from taking risks by subtracting points for risky behavior.
The point of abstracting the study into a game, was to make
it difficult for subjects to perceive a“correct”behavioral pat-
tern. To maintain relevance, we created an environment in
which the subjects would understand the motivation behind
having two authenticators, and the possible usefulness of
this approach.
3.2 Experimental protocol
Because this study was being performed on college stu-
dents, we designed a game emulating a Facebook-style ap-
plication: an application which college students are familiar
with and comfortable navigating. While we considered bas-
ing the game on a banking application, that would have
overemphasized the idea of protecting one’s assets—an at-
titude that would lead to fewer risks taken, but would not
be realistic in the context of everyday applications such as
email, blogs, photo-sharing sites, and so on. Within the
Facebook-style application, which we called Green Book On-
line, subjects were given a fictitious user profile with preset
personal information. The subject was then presented with
a series of “desired updates” to the profile. To perform these
updates, subjects were required to log in to the application
using TwoKind authenticators. Figure 1 shows a screenshot
of Green Book Online.
Figure 1: Screenshot of the low privilege environ-
ment in Green Book Online, where buttons for mod-
ifying personal information and friends have been
removed so that it is absolutely clear that users may
not access these functions.
3.3 Environments
To motivate the idea of safe and unsafe situations, we cre-
ated two different environments in which subjects were asked
to complete tasks. The words“safe”and“unsafe”have strong
connotations of “good” and “bad,” which would overly influ-
ence subjects to behave in a cautious manner. We therefore
described the safe environment as “On this computer, no
previous users have been compromised” and the unsafe en-
vironment as “On this computer, some previous users have
been compromised.” Since users in the real world have no
absolute method to determine whether a workstation is safe,
this choice of wording allows subjects adjust their risk-taking
behavior according to their own perceived risk, thus making
the results more relevant to real-world situations. In an ac-
tual implementation of TwoKind , the users will be creating
their own definitions of safe and risky, or adhering to an or-
ganization’s explanation (such as“Kiosks are to be treated as
untrusted computers”). Our aim was to determine whether
the subjects, given a distinct line between secure and inse-
cure environments, were able to use TwoKind authenticators
to make a distinction at that line in such a way that they
were protected.
3.4 Authenticators
To access their information in either of these environ-
ments, subjects were given the option to log in to an environ-
ment by indicating use of a high password, a low password,
or to not log in at all. We chose to use the word “password”
instead of “authenticator” because users are more familiar
with passwords, and we wanted to avoid describing too much
terminology. We chose not to give subjects real passwords
because password usability has been tested in previous stud-
ies [17] and including a dimension of remembering passwords
would only obfuscate the results we were interested in—the
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effectiveness of the TwoKind model. Additionally, because
TwoKind would not necessarily be implemented with pass-
words, the memorization of two passwords is not central to
the concept of TwoKind , and the results generalize to other
authenticators. The high password option allowed subjects
to view and edit all of their personal information in both
safe and unsafe environments. The low password option al-
lowed subjects to view all of their personal information, but
edit a limited selection of their information. Subjects had
five attributes in their profiles: a list of friends; personal
information like an email address; a profile which shows fa-
vorite movies, books, and so on; a list of groups to which
they belong; and a current status. In high-privilege mode,
the subjects were able to modify all of these attributes. In
low-privilege mode, they only had the ability to modify their
groups, status and profile. These three were chosen as low-
security actions because they are easily reversible and do
not involve modifying the user’s social network or private
information.
When logged in, the subject was presented with a screen of
their information, with certain editing capabilities removed
if they were logged in with their low password. We also
provided the ability to skip a task (users could click on “sit-
uation unfavorable” instead of logging in), which represents
the real-life analog of a person choosing not to perform an
action in an insecure environment. We included this option
to emulate the situation in which a user places security con-
cerns above the mandate of completing a task. Since this is
an optimal choice in some situations, the option to skip (or
otherwise postpone) a task is important to include. Figure 2
shows a screenshot of the login screen.
Figure 2: Screenshot of the login screen
3.5 Task completion and points
There were two types of updates a subject could per-
form: updates that could be completed with either pass-
word, and updates that required their high password. Sub-
jects were presented with 20 desired updates in a random
order, with five updates for each of the four possible situ-
ations: high/low-privilege updates in safe/unsafe environ-
ments. There were, therefore, some tasks that could be
completed only with the high password in an unsafe envi-
ronment.
To motivate subjects to complete tasks, each subject was
given an initial score of 60 points, and earned additional
points for each successfully completed update and sometimes
lost points for risky behavior. At the end of the game, the
subject was given a certain amount of money directly re-
lated to their final score. The subject gained 3 points for
completing a high-privilege task and 1 point for completing
a low-privilege task. There was an unspecified probability
that if a subject logged into an unsafe environment with ei-
ther password, they would lose some of the points they had
accumulated thus far. A compromised high password lost
6 points, while a compromised low password lost 2 points.
Subjects thus focused on maximizing their reward at the end
of the study, instead of task completion.
For a fixed probability p of compromise, the expected gain
in points for unsafe environments is 1 − 2p and 3 − 6p for
low- and high-privilege tasks respectively. The value of p,
however, is unspecified to avoid biasing users towards risking
or not risking passwords. We also did not want to bias
the use of one authenticator over another. Thus for a fixed
p, there is either an expected gain for both types of tasks
or likewise an expected loss for both types. The variance,
however, differs for the two situations, and thus we can study
how many users tend to take higher risks for potentially
higher rewards. This game, therefore, allowed us to study
the effectiveness of the TwoKind model without obviously
biasing the subjects’ choices.
3.6 Survey
To further explore participants’ reaction to the TwoKind
method, and to collect information such as whether partic-
ipants had a background in computer science, we adminis-
tered a closing survey to each participant. We were inter-
ested in measuring how computer-science experience may
lead to a change in security-related behavior and accounted
for it in the results (Section 4). We did not ask for any
more demographic information because of privacy concerns.
Participants were given an option to provide thoughts and
comments as well as to answer specific questions about using
two authenticators for specific applications.
4. RESULTS
We now describe the results of our study. We identify
several categories of users depending on their behavior in
various situations and present results of our survey ques-
tions.
4.1 Patterns of Behavior
While designing our study, we expected subjects to react
to both the type of environment (safe or unsafe) and the level
of privilege (high or low) required for the desired update.
We found that 26 of 33 subjects (79% of all subjects) fit this
pattern, and we discuss the patterns followed by the other 7
subjects (21%). All subjects fit into their categories at least
90% of the time. We attribute minor variations in subjects’
behavior to mistakes, an occasional risk, or uncertainty at
the beginning of the study. These categories provide infor-
mation on trends that are useful in further analysis of the
effectiveness of TwoKind . The patterns are as follows (the
results are summarized in Figure 3):
1. Sensitive to environment and privilege. All 26 sub-
jects in this category (79%) adhered to the principle
of least privilege, i.e., logging in with a high password
only when it was required to complete a task. Users
however, did also respond to the type of environment,
which is important for understanding the effectiveness
of TwoKind . We have further broken this category
down into five patterns.
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Figure 3: Breakdown of subjects into various
groups, with the subsets for group 1, sensitive to
both.
(a) Never risked high password. These subjects
used their high password to complete only high-
privilege tasks in a safe environment. While
some of these subjects were willing to reveal their
low password, none of them took risks with their
high password. This is a safe outcome where the
high password is never compromised. 5 of 33 sub-
jects (15%) fell into this group.
(b) Always risked low password. These subjects al-
ways took risks for the low-privilege tasks (us-
ing their low password), but took risks for high-
privilege tasks (using their high password) in un-
safe environments between 40 and 80% of the
time. This category shows a clear distinction be-
tween the two passwords, with the high password
being better protected. 11 of 33 subjects (33%)
fit into this pattern.
(c) Risked low password more. These subjects took
risks for low-privilege tasks some of the time and
also took risks for the high-privilege tasks some of
the time, but took risks more often in cases where
they can use their low password. The average dis-
parity between the use of high and low passwords
was 35%. Even though these subjects risked their
high passwords at times, they were able to make
a distinction between safe and unsafe situations
and modify their risk-taking behavior, taking less
risks in an unsafe environment. 7 of 33 subjects
(21%) fell into this category.
(d) Risked high password more. These subjects took
risks for both types of tasks and passwords, but
took more risks for the high password. No sub-
jects fell into this category, which is a good indica-
tion that they were making distinctions between
the passwords in a way which favored protecting
their high password.
(e) Risked both equally. Subjects who took risks with
both their high password and their low password,
at the same rate. Subjects in this category under-
stood the difference in privilege, using their low
password whenever possible, and understood the
difference in environment, as demonstrated by a
change in behavior. However, they were equally
likely to risk their high or low password, indi-
cating that they did not appreciate the fact that
risking a high password was a more costly risk
than risking the low password. 3 of 33 subjects
(9%) fell into this category.
2. Other categories. One subject (3%) did not appear
to understand the purpose of having two passwords,
and used the same password regardless of which envi-
ronment he/she was given. This subject was sensitive
to neither environment nor privilege. Two subjects
(6%) ignored the type of environment, and followed
the principle of least privilege for completing tasks.
These subjects were sensitive to privilege but not envi-
ronment and would therefore risk compromise in un-
safe environments. Two subjects (6%) made the de-
cision to always risk their high password, while only
risking their low password some of the time. We call
these subjects gamblers. Lastly, two subjects (6%) did
not seem to have a discernible pattern. We call them
undisciplined users.
Students with computer-science background.
Table 1 shows how experience in computer science (CS)
correlated with subjects’ behavior. 13 subjects (39%) had
a background in some sort of computer science. There were
few differences between the CS and non-CS subjects, but we
discuss the major points of disparity below.
CS students who took risks with both passwords made, on
average, a greater distinction between privilege levels. On
average, the disparity between high and low was 50% for
CS students, as opposed to 28% for non-CS students. For
example, if a CS student risked their low password 80% of
the time, they would risk their high password 30% of the
time, while a non-CS student would risk their high password
52% of the time, a noticeable difference. In short, non-CS
students were more likely to risk their high passwords.
Consistent with the previous finding, CS students also had
a lower risk-taking tendency in the category Sensitive to
both: always take low-privilege risks (1b). CS students who
always risked their low password risked their high password
48% of the time, as opposed to non-CS students, who risked
their high password 67% of the time. It is also interesting
to note that neither of the gamblers were CS students.
In cases where users are weighing the risks and potential
benefits, CS students tend to be more risk-conscious and
cautious about revealing their passwords and appear to bet-
ter understand the difference between privilege levels and
the need to protect the high authenticator in unsafe envi-
ronments.
4.2 General Trends
It is important to note that there were several overarch-
ing trends. All but four users followed the principle of least
privilege, using their high password only when it was nec-
essary to complete the task, and using the low password
whenever they could. The prominence of this behavior is a
positive sign towards individuals using the lowest privilege
possible, and by proxy leaving themselves open to as little
risk as they can. Again, it is interesting to see how these
users behave in unsafe environments, since the principle of
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Table 1: Number of computer science students in each behavior group
Category CS Students Non-CS Students Total
Sensitive to both: never take high-privilege risks 15% 15% 15%
Sensitive to both: always take low-privilege risks 38% 30% 33%
Sensitive to both: take low-privilege risks more often 8% 30% 21%
Sensitive to both: take high-privilege risks more often 0% 0% 0%
Sensitive to both: take equal risks for both types of tasks 15% 5% 9%
(Sensitive to both: totals) (76%) (80%) (79%)
Sensitive to neither environment nor privilege 8% 0% 3%
Sensitive to privilege but not environment 8% 5% 6%
Sensitive to environment but not privilege 0% 0% 0%
Gamblers 0% 10% 6%
Undisciplined Users 8% 5% 6%
least privilege by itself will result in the compromise of the
high authenticator when used in unsafe environments.
While few users were willing to skip tasks on a consistent
basis, they were able to show good decision-making skills in
weighing the risks of using their high password as opposed to
the low password, often protecting their high password more
than their low password. This behavior is consistent with
the goals of TwoKind , which aims not to create a method
of absolute rules for when to use high versus low, but to
give the users the choice of protecting some capabilities over
others, and allowing low-privilege tasks to be accomplished
in unsafe environments.
Overall, 70% of subjects were sensitive to both (group 1)
and made a distinction between the passwords in an unsafe
environment (risking high less). We conclude that TwoKind
provides a multiple authentication method that is useful to
this 70% of users, who make a conscious decision based on
the perceived risks and are more protective of their high au-
thenticator.
4.3 Task Groups
It is also interesting to see how subjects reacted to groups
of tasks. Recall, there were four main groups that tasks
fall into; permutations of the safe or unsafe environment
combined with a high- or low-privilege tasks. Figure 4 shows
how subjects reacted to these four situations.
1. High-privilege task, safe environment. Subjects over-
whelmingly chose to log in with their high password,
(90% of the time) since there was no reason to do oth-
erwise.
2. High-privilege task, unsafe environment. We observed
a fairly even split between users who attempted to log
in with their high password and those who skipped
the task, with a small percentage trying multiple au-
thenticators. These users were probably trying to ac-
complish the task with the low password, and most of
them skipped when this was not possible. About half
of the time (49%), subjects would have protected their
high password from compromise.
3. Low-privilege task, safe environment. Although in
this environment it would have been safe to use the
high password, we see an overwhelming majority
(86%) choosing to use their low password, which shows
that subjects followed the principle of least privilege.
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Figure 4: Chart of task groupings. This figure
shows the overall reaction of subjects to various per-
mutations of safe/risky environment and high/low-
privilege tasks.
4. Low-privilege task, unsafe environment. A small per-
centage (8%) of subjects risked their high password
here, but the majority (58%) chose to log in with their
low password. It is interesting to see that a significant
number of subjects (33%) chose to also protect their
low password from compromise as well, and skipped
these tasks.
It is important to remember that each of these groups con-
tains five tasks each from 33 subjects, meaning that individ-
ual users could have been inconsistent over these groups, as
we saw with the patterns discussed above. Subjects followed
the patterns they were placed into 90% of the time, and
while those patterns varied widely in several circumstances
(i.e., the subjects who never risked their high passwords ver-
sus those who always risked their high passwords) analyzing
the overall trends gives us an idea of how the method would
be used by a larger population, regardless of the 10% incon-
sistency from subjects. These overall trends from groups of
tasks, when combined with the patterns we discussed above,
gives a full picture of users’ behavior. 49% of the time, sub-
jects protect their high password from compromise, and an
even higher percentage (70%) meet the goals of the TwoKind
project of making pragmatic decisions depending on the type
of environment. We posit that this is a large enough portion
6
of the population to establish TwoKind as a viable future
authentication mechanism.
4.4 Survey Results
We administered a closing survey to users from the study,
asking them a few questions which have helped us to iden-
tify where TwoKind may be most useful. They were asked
whether they had taken any computer science classes, and
their answers were taken into account when analyzing the
data and creating patterns. The following questions on
TwoKind for email authentication, and Friend-finder pass-
words (explicitly stated below) interest us the most. Table 2
shows the responses received from the first two questions.
TwoKind for email authentication.
The first question concerns an email application, Blitz-
Mail, which is pervasive on the Dartmouth College campus.
Undergraduate students use the application for email, but
also treat it as a means of instantaneous communication, of-
ten in place of cellphones or more popular instant-messaging
programs. Public BlitzMail terminals are located around
campus, and students regularly log into these computers,
which could easily be compromised.
The question asks: Suppose you had an additional pass-
word for BlitzMail that would allow you to read any mail in
your inbox and send messages, but not to read mail in other
folders or the trash. Given that the low-privilege password
would limit the risk of other people reading your mail, would
you use the additional (low-privilege) password in insecure
situations, such as Blitz terminals around campus?
Responses to this question varied, and 45% of the subjects
expressing interest in this option. The reasons given for neg-
ative responses show that students were generally receptive
to the idea, but wanted more flexibility in the passwords, so
that they could specify their own preferences for low pass-
word capabilities. Several students, for instance, indicated
that they don’t use folders for their mail, so such an op-
tion would be useless to them. Others wanted an option
that would not allow deleting or moving mail from the in-
box, while others wanted to go even further and not allow
new mail to be sent with the low password. Considering how
ingrained the current BlitzMail system is in the undergradu-
ate community, that 45% of subjects were willing to consider
changing their current authentication method is a significant
statement. If one further includes those that would consider
it with added features or increased flexibility, the percentage
rises to 60%.
Friend-finder passwords.
The second question concerns a larger issue: Many sites,
such as Facebook, offer a “friend finder” service that asks
users to give their email address and password, which they
will use to download your address book and find your friends
for you. However, this gives them unlimited access to your
email account. If there were a low-privilege password that
was designed so that it would only allow access to your ad-
dress book and NO abilities to read or send mail, would you
find it useful in these situations?
The responses to this question were a fairly even split of
yes (48%) and no (45%), but more positive than the answers
to the last one. While many of the comments indicated that
users were unwilling to use “friend finder” as-is, several in-
dicated that if a password existed that allowed programs
to have access only to their address book, they would take
this option. One subject even expressed surprise that the
social-networking applications as-is have access to her full
account. He/she had no idea that by giving her email ad-
dress and password he/she was giving them implicit access
to everything from that account. While this reaction is more
extreme than we found among most subjects, the desire for
more restricted access is clearly a common one, as indicated
by the answers to the question. We argue that this need can
be filled by the TwoKind authentication method, as sup-
ported by our survey responses.
Free-form feedback.
The third question merely asked for other comments on
the user study or the application. Five subjects mentioned
that having multiple passwords is a cumbersome method,
an issue that we discuss in Section 2. One person specifi-
cally said “Unless you make people aware of the risks, the
inconvenience of having two passwords is higher.” This is
an excellent point that brings to light the importance that
education would have to play in implementing the TwoKind
authentication method. Without some minimal education,
users would be unsure of the point of two authenticators and
where they should use them.
Another comment indicated that for people to make the
best use of TwoKind , the users would have to be able to
make choices about what capabilities they want for the
low [authenticator]. Since each user is likely to have differ-
ent privacy or security preferences, flexible settings would
allow users to personalize the passwords in a way which is
most convenient for them. For consistent results, this study
did not address this concern, but it could be addressed in
further work.
4.5 Scope of the user study
We performed our study on 33 Dartmouth College under-
graduate students, and our results are therefore representa-
tive of a younger college-going demographic. Further work
could seek to explore the differences between college stu-
dents’ use of TwoKind , and use among the general public.
Our study presented users with a single task to be com-
pleted in a particular situation. It is possible that users’
behavior will be altered when they log into their account for
long-lived sessions to perform multiple tasks. Our results
are more relevant to occasional and small bursts of activity
such as checking email messages or reviewing bank balances
at a public kiosk, or the occasional use of “friend finder”
services on social-networking websites.
Our study does not address the issue of how users judge
whether they are in an untrustworthy environment. Instead,
our study seeks only to see how users’ behavior changes in
what they perceive as a safe or unsafe environment. In prac-
tice, users would need to be educated that, for example,
computer science labs were safe, but kiosks were not. More-
over, it is possible that users might consider their personal
computers to be in a different class (“absolutely safe”?) and
use their high passwords exclusively instead of following the
principle of least privilege for email and bank accounts. In
the future it might be interesting to study more about the
two types of environments.
5. RELATEDWORK
The concept of principle of least privilege has been known
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Table 2: Responses to the survey questions
Question No Yes Uncertain
Would use TwoKind with BlitzMail 55% 36% 9%
Would use TwoKind with “friend finder” 45% 48% 6%
for several decades [12]. This principle states that users
should log in with only enough privileges necessary to ac-
complish the desired task. Our work provides users with
multiple authenticators associated with different levels of
privilege, but does not emphasize this principle. Instead, we
expect users to employ authenticators based on the trustwor-
thiness of the environment. For example, users may trust
their personal laptop machines, and log into their email ac-
count with full-privileged access, but use a low-privileged
password when using an untrusted machine.
TwoKind allows users to signal untrustworthy environ-
ments to servers. Some websites include radio buttons on
the login page that ask users to indicate whether they are on
a public computer.9 If so, the user’s credentials or personal
information are not stored within the browser as a cookie.
The problem with this approach is that it is not designed to
thwart malicious administrators, who can easily invert the
user’s choice. Signaling using TwoKind, on the other hand,
cannot be subverted by a malicious administrator, since the
authentication token itself encodes the trustworthiness of
the environment.
Instead or relying on the user to signal the type of envi-
ronment, the server may be able to determine the trustwor-
thiness of the client configuration by itself. For example,
Seshadri et al. [13] have developed a remote software attes-
tation technique using which a server can ensure that the
remote machine is in a valid configuration. In the context
of our problem, the server could degrade the privileges as-
sociated with the session if it is unable to attest the remote
platform. Along these lines, computers now shipping with
the Trusted Platform Module [16] can use the Direct Anony-
mous Attestation (DAA) protocol [3] to attest to its trust-
worthy configuration anonymously (earlier versions of the
TPM specification allowed for attestation without the pri-
vacy guarantees of DAA). Garriss et al. [5] leverage users’
mobile devices to assess the integrity of a kiosk’s software
before using it. The problem with these techniques is that
they have not seen widespread deployment. Since most in-
stallations (e.g., at Internet cafes) do not run such attesta-
tion services, our approach is still the most practical since it
does not require any modification of the client configuration.
Furthermore, even if the server has determined that the re-
mote platform is untrustworthy, it has no way of warning
the user, thereby limiting the utility of these approaches. In
contrast, TwoKind allows users to determine the trustwor-
thiness of the environment for themselves and act upon that
determination.
Other work has explored“proxy certificates”as a means to
delegate limited privileges to other users or platforms. Users
rely on certificate repositories such as MyProxy [2] to issue
temporary proxy certificates when needed. Followup work
such as SHEMP: Secure Hardware Enhanced MyProxy [9]
9More recently, services such as Hotmail and Google Mail
have explicitly asked if they should“Remember [the user] on
this computer?”
extends this approach to make the credential repository
more trustworthy. The limitation of these approaches is that
users have no way to access these repositories from an un-
trusted machine. To address this shortcoming, Sinclair and
Smith [15] create a “Portable PKI”where users can leverage
trusted mobile devices to generate proxy certificates for un-
trusted machines. A proxy certificate is downloaded to the
workstation, with attached privileges for the session. Sharp
et al. [14] allow users to make use of untrusted displays using
a trusted mobile device—the trusted device displays the sen-
sitive information, while the untrusted display shows only
general information. While these techniques are certainly
viable options for untrustworthy environments, they require
modifications to the client machines. Again, TwoKind does
not require any such modifications, and is a practical solu-
tion in the near term.
One concern with our approach is that it requires users
to memorize additional passwords. On the issue of mem-
orability, Yan et al. [17] have found that passwords based
on mnemonic phrases tend to be as memorable as naively-
selected passwords, and as secure as randomly-selected pass-
words. Unfortunately, about 10% of users did not comply
with the password-selection guidelines and were therefore
easily compromised. We emphasize again that in our sys-
tem the low password is expected to be compromised, and
hope that users can create simple mnemonic phases for their
low passwords.
Gaw and Felten [6] found that as users get older, they
accumulate more accounts online. Yet, users tend to have
only about three distinct passwords that they tend to reuse,
and the number of distinct passwords does not seem to grow
with the number of unique accounts. We expect that users
may create a low password that is reused across several ac-
counts, and will have a low-level of security associated with
that password (further justifying its reuse across several ac-
counts).
Halderman et al. [7] develop a technique that requires
users to memorize only one password. Using a secure hash
function, this password can be transformed into distinct
passwords for each website. Related approaches include
those by Yee and Sitaker [18]. This technique reduces the
burden on a user’s memorization, although the user must
still rely on the client computer to compute these hashes.
This technique, therefore, is not meant to be used in un-
trustworthy environments, and protects against passwords
compromised by the server and not against malicious client
machines.
6. FUTUREWORK
The results from our study suggest several possible areas
for further investigation. It would be interesting to study
how multiple passwords affect the security of each individual
password, any relationships between passwords for a particu-
lar account (does a user’s low password provide a hint about
the high password?), and how users would react to having
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to remember and maintain additional passwords. Further
exploration of the usability of other authentication methods
like PKI tokens would provide a more complete survey of
security solutions.
Additionally, it would be interesting to study how privi-
lege levels could be set and maintained, and the behavior of
users when given the opportunity to set their own privilege
levels. In our study, we told users whether a situation was
safe or unsafe. Research into users’ ability to judge the se-
curity of real-world situations would provide insight into the
effectiveness of solutions like TwoKind.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a method called TwoKind Authentication,
which protects users from malicious administrators or third
party services. Using the low authenticator, users can sig-
nal untrustworthy environments to the server and reduce the
privileges associated with that session. A compromised au-
thenticator, therefore, allows attackers only limited access to
private information. We performed a user experiment with
thirty-three subjects, in which 70% of users employed the
two authenticators in a way which was consistent with the
goals of TwoKind , including making distinctions between
environments, recognizing privilege levels, and protecting
the high authenticator by means of the low authentica-
tor. Furthermore, 49% of the time, subjects did not risk
their high authenticator in unsafe environments. Our study
suggests that for the majority of users, TwoKind would en-
able better security practices in the real world.
We believe that the TwoKind method is a feasible and
useful authentication method, which is an improvement to
the current practice of using a single high-privilege authenti-
cator, or repeatedly requiring high-privilege authenticators
for certain actions. Although users may not always use the
TwoKind method ideally, allowing their high authenticator
to be compromised on occasion, it appears that the major-
ity of users would employ TwoKind to their benefit. Since
the study on the whole demonstrated that users are willing
to use the low authenticator to protect the high authenti-
cator, TwoKind seems to generally increase the security of
high-privilege actions and reduce the risk of compromise in
unsafe environments.
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